1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	Civil Action No. 06-11508-RCL
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5	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
6	SUZANNA SENSING, * *
7	Plaintiff, * *
8	v. * MOTION HEARING *
O	OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE OF *
9	FLORIDA, INC. and CHARLES * KOZMITS, *
10	Defendants. *
11	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
12	
13	BEFORE: The Honorable William G. Young,
14	District Judge
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16	ADDEAD ANGEG
17	APPEARANCES:
18	PAUL H. MERRY, ESQ., 50 Congress Street, 10th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02109, on behalf
19	of the Plaintiff
20	DDITO DINGY & MELGH LLD (De Tales D. Walsh
21	BELLO, BLACK & WELSH LLP (By John F. Welsh, III, Esq.), 535 Boylston Street, Suite 1102,
22	Boston, Massachusetts 02116, on behalf of the Defendants
23	
24	1 Courthouse Way Boston, Massachusetts
25	April 15, 2008

1 Calling Civil Action 06-11508, Sensing THE CLERK: 2 v. Outback. THE COURT: Would counsel introduce themselves. 3 MR. MERRY: Good afternoon, your Honor. May it 4 I'm here 5 please the Court, my name is Paul Merry. representing plaintiff, Suzanna Sensing, the nonmoving party 6 7 in the summary judgment motion. MR. WELSH: Representing defendants Charles Kozmits 8 and Outback Steakhouse of Florida, John F. Welsh, Bello, 9 Black and Welsh. 10 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 Mr. Merry, I recognize you're the nonmoving party, 13 but I think it would sharpen things if I heard you first. 14 Given the nature of the claims here and the record, 15 why isn't summary judgment in order in this case? 16 MR. MERRY: Your Honor, this case is brought under 17 state law as opposed to federal law. General Laws, 18 Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 151B, Section 4, Paragraph 16 reads approximately, as follows: For any, it 19 20 is an illegal practice for any employer, personally or through an agent, to, and I'm leaving some words out, to 21 22 refuse to rehire or otherwise discriminate against, because 23 of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified 24 handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position, a position involved with 25

reasonable accommodation.

I mention this to the Court because I think this provides a bit of a succinct roadmap for us in assessing

Ms. Sensing's claims and the basis for them.

Ms. Sensing, as I believe is clear from the papers, I hope it's clear from the papers, is a person with multiple sclerosis. She was diagnosed with that disease in 2003 or around at that point, but as the Court may be aware, multiple sclerosis is a condition that degenerates over time. She didn't have major impairments attributable to it until approximately November of 2004 when, after returning from a trip with some friends, she experienced numbness and some rather severe symptoms that were severe enough that she was actually bedridden and unable to turn over in bed at some points, she was extremely disabled by this condition.

However, with medical care and the passage of time, as is typical with multiple sclerosis, she resumed, she recuperated to the point where she was able to go back to work. The employer defendant Outback and the defendant Kozmits accommodated her to some degree by, by having staff do some of the lifting problems that she was having trouble with, and some of the other tasks. And by, I think maybe late February or so she was in a condition where she was able to return to employment fully without restrictions.

However, she had a couple of incidents and another

incident occurred in April which required her to be out of work. When she contacted the defendants about resuming employment, she was essentially told that she would not be put back to work. There were a series of conversations, I believe eight in number, where she approached the defendant saying, look, I have doctors' notes, in fact, she got, I think at least two certifications from physicians that she was capable of resuming her duties as a takeaway person. And ultimately the defendant Kozmits said to her in one conversation, I'm concerned about you falling and costing the restaurant 200,000 to \$300,000, and I can't have that, or words to that effect.

He at one point suggested to her that he wanted her to be evaluated by an independent medical examiner, and he said he would provide the name of one. She contacted him -- this was during the sequence of these eight efforts she made to resume employment. And she contacted him at least twice to try to get the name of that person. Mr. Kozmits indicates in his deposition that he was trying to get the headquarters of Outback in Florida to identify an appropriate medical examiner, and they never did so, and he never told her of any medical examiner. And after that point is when she began making this effort to seek legal redress on account of her being, not being restored to employment.

The law, as I feel fairly confident the Court's aware, under the disability law basically you have to show that you're a person who, a qualified person with a handicap. Qualified person means someone with a disability that substantially impairs major life activities. And I think that the materials we've offered demonstrate pretty convincingly that Ms. Sensing meets the test substantial impairment of major life activity. Not only do we have affidavits from Ms. Sensing and her husband concerning her complete incapacity in November of 2004, but we also have affidavits from defendants' witnesses avowing that they saw her unable to perform some of the functions of the job and impaired in the major life activity of walking to the extent that she was dragging her leg, and a variety of other problems.

THE COURT: Maybe I've made a mistake. I mean, I asked you to go first and you are, very succinctly.

Isn't their major argument -- this is where I may be off-base -- that there isn't sufficient evidence in this record from which a fact finder could conclude that she was not restored to employment on account of her handicap, and you have to prove that.

Let's start with this. You recognize you have to prove that?

MR. MERRY: Yes, your Honor, by a preponderance of

the evidence, and we can use inferential evidence.

THE COURT: Of course. And I must draw all reasonable inferences your way at this stage.

Isn't that their major argument here?

MR. MERRY: Well, that's certainly one of the arguments they're making, but I don't see that it offers a basis on which to grant summary judgment. And there's two answers, your Honor. There's direct -- there's two kinds of evidence that we can use, inferential or circumstantial evidence, or direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence is very suggestive from the timing of the decision not to restore her to employment following on the heels of these repeated absences due to her MS condition. As well as I think that there's material in the comments, testimony, in the depositions and in the affidavits, clearly suggesting that they were well aware of her condition and that they were troubled by her condition.

Certainly Erin Ray, who is, it's a little hard to tell if she's a manager or she's something between a manager and a staff person, but she is what they call the key employee, and she was responsible for scheduling, and she testified to her severe doubts concerning Ms. Sensing's condition.

So I think that there's circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the claim. But more importantly,

there's the direct evidence of when Ms. Sensing called the individual defendant and said here I am, I'm ready to come back to work, I have a doctor's clearance. And he said we don't want you to come back because we're concerned about liability, we don't want you to have a fall and incur two or three hundred thousand dollars of damage.

Now, it's true, your Honor, he did not say we don't want you to come back because you have multiple sclerosis.

But I think that's a relatively easy inferential leap to make. He didn't say he's concerned about safety. He didn't say he's concerned she will fall on someone else. He is concerned about her specific health condition. And we would submit to the Court that that's a sufficient basis to support an inference that this was the cause.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let's hear from -- have I got your major thrust accurately?

MR. WELSH: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WELSH: Your Honor, three points, four points in brief.

First, coming into the case and all the way to plaintiff's deposition, I assumed that her status as a handicapped individual would be beyond dispute. It was at her deposition where she swore that she had no symptoms of MS since her leave of absence back in November, December,

and that she was, and she stopped working for us the end of April or May.

Given that I have a summary judgment standard, the facts are supposed to be construed in light most favorable to her, if we assume that's her testimony, she hasn't proved that she's a disabled individual. What we have to do here is discredit her testimony and look at the testimony of others who are co-workers of her to establish that she is disabled within the meaning of the statute.

Put that aside for now, your Honor.

THE COURT: And let's assume that because -- well, go ahead. Let's assume that.

MR. WELSH: The second standard, your Honor, whether or not she abandoned the interactive process.

Again, on April 21st, she was tearful at work, she was complaining. Mr. Kozmits talked to her two co-workers who talked with her, they sent her home. It was a flare-up of her MS condition. She couldn't feel anything from her waste down. There's a doctor's note a couple of weeks before establishing that.

The next day she shows up to get her check. It is reported to Mr. Kozmits, the decision maker, by two people that they talked to her, she's in terrible shape, she shouldn't be driving, she can't do her work.

Her next scheduled shift is the 23rd. She calls in

sick. Mr. Kozmits meets with her three or four times, the eight times that they talk about, several conversations where she said, I want to go back to my takeaway position. He says I don't know what to do. I don't think you're able to.

It ends up on May 5th they have a conversation.

Mr. Kozmits said we would like you to submit to an IME, to our doctor, to see if you're safe enough to go back to a takeaway, but in the meantime we'll give you an interim light-duty position as host that you can do that.

Her response in her deposition were twofold.

First, I don't want an interim job because I can make more if I just file for unemployment. Second, there was a breakdown in communications between her and Kozmits. Why didn't you call Mr. Kozmits back? I decided at that time I had enough. I was going to leave it with the attorneys. I thought they were jerking me around. She didn't follow up. I would submit, your Honor, there's a basic obligation on behalf of an employee seeking an accommodation to follow up, not to walk away.

I cited a U.S. Magistrate Collings' case on this point, and there are others.

Two other points. With respect to her disability, the Carroll case in the First Circuit would suggest, if you were disabled back in November, but you were not disabled at

1 the time of the alleged discrimination, it raises questions 2 about your status as a disabled individual. 3 My last two points, your Honor, on the defamation The Barry case by the Supreme Judicial Court talks claim. 4 directly to this type of situation, pretext reference call. 5 They said a pretext reference call does not constitute 6 7 publication for the purpose of defamation. It's on all, that case is on all four points with this claim. There's an 8 9 Appeals Court case in Massachusetts on the same. 10 Lastly, with respect to the contract, your Honor, 11 we still haven't had an identification of the policy that is 12 alleged to have been violated to support a breach of 13 contract. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. I'll take the matter under 15 advisement. 16 MR. WELSH: Thank you, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: It's been very helpful. Thank you very 18 much. 19 MR. MERRY: Thank you, your Honor. 20 (Whereupon the matter concluded.) 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE I, Donald E. Womack, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand notes taken in the aforementioned matter to the best of my skill and ability. /S/ DONALD E. WOMACK DONALD E. WOMACK Official Court Reporter P.O. Box 51062 Boston, Massachusetts 02205-1062 womack@megatran.com